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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
It is submitted that the majority of the Court seem to have fail-
ed to appreciate the nature of the problem at hand, and that Mr.
Justice Ritz, in his dissenting opinion, sponsors what is apparently
the better view. -M. T. V. H.
RECENT CASES.
ADVERSE POSSESSION-WHAT CONSTITUTES-OccuPANCY UNDER
A PAROL GIFT.-An oil and gas company agreed to convey one-half
acre of surface land to a school board as soon as the land was
measured in metes and bounds. In reliance on such promise the
school board entered, built a school house and held possession for
fifteen years without receiving the deed as promised. A contro-
versy then arose between the parties as to the rights to the oil and
gas under this land. The question was whether such entry and
occupancy were adverse so that title to the land and to the oil
and gas would be acquired under it. Held, No title was acquired.
Bumpus et ;l v. Ohio Cities Gas Co., et at., 103 S. E. 62 (W.
Va. 1920).
It is well settled authority that where one enters land pursu-
ant to a parol gift and holds exclusive possession, such possession
is adverse. Sumner v. Stevens, 47 Mass. 337; Schafer v. Hauser,
111 Mich. 622. Virginia is the only state holding such possession
subordinate to the owner's title. Clarke v. McClure, 10 Gratt. 305
(Va). In the principal case there was a promise without con-
sideration and the relation existing between the parties was purely
that of donor-donee. In support of its conclusion the West Vir-
ginia court cites two cases which hold that possession acquired
under an executory contract does not form the basis of adverse
possession. James Sons Co. v. Hutchinson, 79 W. Va. 389, 90 S.
E. 1047; Hudson v. Putney, 14 W. Va. 561. Adverse possession
is founded on a claim of ownership. Schafer v. Hauser, supra.
Possession, under an executory contract, however, differs from that
under a parol gift. The executory contract shows that the vendee
has entered in recognition of the true owner and therefore he can-
not hold adversely without some hostile assertion of ownership.
Greeno v. Munson, 9 Vt. 37. But where there is a parol gift of
the land, as in tlie principal case, the donee enters as owner and
the donor admits such ownership. Though the court's decision on
the question of adverse possession is open to criticism the actual
holding in the case may be supported. The school board acquired
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RECEKT CASES
the surface land by a claim of right, but they asserted no owner
ship over the oil and gas that would give them title to it by
the runnig of the statutory period. In other words, the conclusion
of the court was right had they confined their decision to the oil
and gas rights. -W. F. B.
CONSIDERATION-WHAT CONSTITUTES THE CONSIDERATION.-A
and B mutually agreed to allow C to receive the dividends on the
stock owned by them in the X Co. The X Co. paid dividends
to C, in accordance with this agreement, for four years. A then
instructed the X Co. to pay no further dividends on his stock to
C. The X Co. filed a bill of interpleader to determine to whom the
dividends should be paid. Held, the dividends on A's stock must
be paid to A. Banner Window Glass Co. v. Barriat et al., 102 S.
E. 726 (W. Va. 1920).
A West Virginia statute gives a party the right to sue on a
contract made for his benefit. W. VA. CODE, c. 71, § 2. The
question here, then, is whether there was a contract. This depends
upon whether there was a consideration for A's promise. A bene-
fit to the promisor, or a detriment to the promisee, is a valuable
consideration. See WALD's POLLOCK, CONTRACTS, 3 ed., 185 n.
1. If the promisee suffers a detriment, it is immaterial whether
or not the promisor is benefited. German v. Gilbert, 83 Mo. App.
411; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256. A detriment
consists in giving up some legal right or privilege. German v.
Gilbert, supra; Hamer v. Sidway, supra; Ballard v. Burton, 64
Vt. 387, 24 Atl. 769; Bainbridge v. Firmstone, 8 A & E. 743, 112
Eng. Reprint 1019; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309, 113 Eng. Re-
print 210. Mutual promises are sufficient consideration for one
another. Buckinghtam v. Ludlum, 40 N. J. Eq. 422; Phillips v.
Preston, 5 How. 278 (U. S.); Walke v. McGehee, 11 Ala. 273.
See WALDI"s POLLOcK, CONTRACTS, 3 ed., 201. The promise, and
not the performance, is the consideration. ITWalke v. McGeltee,
supra; Buckingham v. Ludlum, supra; United & Globe Rubber
Mfg. Cos. v. Conrad et al., 80 N. J. L. 286, 78 Atl. 203. In the
principal case it is difficult to see why B's promise was not suffi-
cient consideration. B was not obliged to enter into this agree-
ment with A, nor to make A the promise he did. If B had promis-
ed to pay and had paid his share of the dividends to A, it would
be clear that B had suffered a legal detriment. He suffers the
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